Volume 1
Issue 1 The Forum - Volume 1, Issue 1
2-1897

The Forum - Volume 1, Issue 2

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 1, Issue 2, 1 DICK. L. REV. 25 (1897).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol1/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
Vol. I.

FEBRUARY, 1897.

No. 2.

Published Monthly by the Students of

THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW,
CARLISLE, PA.
EDITORS.
H.

FRANKLIN KANTNER.

FREDERICK B.

HARVEY S. KISER.

MOSER.

CHARLES E. DANIELS.

BUSINESS MANAGERS.
GEORGE B. SOMERVILLE.
ROBERT W. IRVING.

CLEON N. BERNTHEISEL.
SAMUEL B. HARE.

JOSEPH F. BIDDLE.

ADAIR HERMAN.

Subscription, $1.25 per Annum.
Address all Communications to

THE FORUM,

EDITORIAL.
THE TIME TEST.
It is the fashion to test a man's fitness
to become a lawyer, in part, by the time
he has professedly spent in acquiring the
fitness. If lie has studied law only one
year, lie cannot be fit. If he has studied
law three years, how very fit he must be!
Now, if we knew nothing else of one
person's knowledge than that he had
spent three years in acquiring it, and of
another'person's than that he had spent
but one year, we should reasonably infer
that the former had larger knowledge than
the latter. Were there no examining
boards, it would be well enough to say
that no one should be admitted to the
bar until he had seemed to study two or
three years. But there are examining
boards. And their declared reason for
being is that they may learn what the
candidate knows. That being so, what
more idle or stupid policy than that of requiring a certain minimum time to elapse
between the commencement of the study
and the admission to the bar? Two men
come before the same board at the same
time. They are found equally intelligent,
equally well informed on the law. But
Mr. A. gained his competence by a good
mind sedulously applied during one year.
Mr. B. gained his competence by a dull
mind sedulously applied during three
years, or he gained his competence by a
good mind exerted lazily and spasmodically upon the law during three years.
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Which of the two gives the better promise?
But Mr. B. will be taken and Mr. A. will
be left. If Mr. A. had themerit of having
spent three years instead of one in gaining
what qualification he has, he would be
taken too!
So, it comes to pass, that, the rule prescribing a time test is a discrimination
against capacity and industry, and a
premium on incompetence and indolence.
The editors are sincerely gratified by
the cordial greetings extended to THE
FORum. Kind expressions and congratulations have been received from many
gentlemen of much prominence in the
legal world, and the newspapers of several
cities have welcomed warmly the new
periodical. To one and all we extend our
hearty thanks for their kind words.
The thanks of the students of Dickinson School of Law are extended to
the Court of Cumberland county for
favors shown them in the court house.
The students appreciate the courtesies extended whereby they are allowed seats
.within the bar enclosure during the trials
of cases. They thus obtain at short
range a practical exemplification of the
working of the court.
WEwish to thank the editors of The
Dickinsonian for their very kind words
of praise and encouragement for THE
FORUM in recent numbers of their weekly.
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THE ALUMNI.
H. Eugene Marker, '95, was admitted to
the bar of Westmoreland County in the
beginning of October, 1896. He has an
office with his preceptor, H. A. Cline,
Esq., in Greensburg, the county seat. In
recent bereavements, he has our sincere
sympathy.
Richard J. Goodall, '96, was admitted to
the Blair County bar in the second week of
December, 1896. He immediately opened
an office in Tyrone, and within a week
afterwards was able to report that he had
already had some business.

George W. Huntley, Jr:, '93, has lately
opened an office at Mt. Carmel, Pa. He
was formerly located at Ridgway. Other
considerations than the quest for clients
induced the change, for he was doing well
in the latter town. He is at present concerned with the Hon. George A. Jenks, of
Brookville, in a case involving a $26,000
estate in Jefferson County.

George B. Parker, of the class of '96, was
admitted to the Pittsburg bar some time
ago. He passed the very rigid examination of the Examining Committee of that
city with a most excellent showing. Governor Hastings lately appointed him a
notary public. He has his office in the
Park Building.
Samuel A. Lewis, '95, was admitted to
the Frederick, Md., bar a few months ago.
He is forging ahead well in his profession.

Jacob H. Reiff, '95, is located at New
Cumberland, Pa. Besides practicing in
Cumberland County, he has considerable
business in the Dauphin County Courts,
to which bar he was lately admitted. He
was a welcome visitor at his alma mater a
few weeks ago.
Herman Berg, Jr., '96, has opened pleasant offices in the Henderson Building, Carlisle. His clientage is increasing from day
to day and as a consequence he is in a happy
frame of mind.

E. J. Jones, '96, has already established a
lucrative practice at St. Marys, Elk
County, Pa. In order to be admitted, he
was subjected to a rigid examination
which he passed very satisfactorily. He
is the attorney for the St. Marys' branch
of the National Building and Loan Association.
John M. Rhey, of the class of '96, has
our hearty congratulations on his reappointment as Journal Clerk of the Pennsylvania State Senate. He occupied a similar position at the last session, and his
valuable services then secured his reappointment. He has an office in Carlisle.
Charles C. Greer, '93, is located at Johnstown, Pa., where he has a pleasant home.
Fis wife was a Miss Bratton, of Carlisle.
He has had unusual success in the practice
of his profession.
Samuel Morrow, '96, is associated in the
practice of his profession with his brother
at Altoona. A class-mate who saw hiiu
lately reports him as being pleased with
his work thus far and hopeful of the future.
M. J. Dixon, '96, is located at WilkesBarre where he is acquiring an extensive
practice. He also has a branch office at
his home in Avoca, Pa.
Rush Trescott, '95, is practicing at
Wilkes-Barre, where he is meeting with
great success. Mr. Trescott is a nephew
of Ex-Judge Rhone, of Wilkes-Barre.

S. S. Herring, '92, has his office at
ie is a member of the firm
Wilkes-Barre.
of Herring and McCormick, which enjoys
a large and lucrative practice in Luzerne
County.
Neil C. MacEwen, '92, is situated at
Kane, Pa., and is a successful lawyer. He
has been interested in several very important suits, the most noted being that of the
Kane Borough v. the Kane heirs, which
involved about fifteen hundred acres and
numerous buildings. He is solicitor for
the borough, and is extensively interested
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in real estate and insurance lines. He
recently formed a partnership with exDistrict-Attorney Calkins, of Cameron
County. He visited his alma mater last
month.
J. Wilmer Fisher, Esq., '96, spent a few
days in Carlisle, leaving for Reading on
the 1st inst. He has acquired some practice in the Orphans' Court, and intends to
make this class of work a specialty.
John MI. Wilson, of the class of '94, has
his residence at Trout Run, Pa., and
He is repractices at Williamsport.
pdrted as doing well.

THE LACKAWANNA ALUINL
Every class that has been graduated from
the Dickinson School of Law is represented at the Lackawanna Bar, and one class
is misrepresented. There are twelve of us
here, and the object of this article called
by your editor "News Notes," is not to
send news, not to encourage hope in undergraduates, not to suppress truth, but to
sound a note of warning. "Don't come to
Scranton." There has been a committee
appointed by the Judges of Lackawanna
(at the request of the Bar) whose business
it will be to catch all men who intend to
apply for admission here, and to kill them,
or commit them without benefit of clergy.
Don't come, we're full, I mean the Bar is
is, what I really want to say is
fll-that
that the Superior Court is sitting here this
week.
W. D. Boyer, '92, who, with W. MI.
Curry, occupies a suite of four offices in the
Commonwealth Building, is doing a flourishing business. Boyer is one of the successful promoters of Scranton. He can
sell more bonds-printed on green paper
and having thereto attached a peck or two
of worthless coupons--than any man that
came out of the Law School.
S. C. Boyer, '93, says the law is too dirty
for him. He has left it and gone into the
book business. What do you think of a
man who says the "law is dirty," and goes
into the business of selling George Elliot's
novqls at $25.00 per set-half down and the
other half at $1.00 per month? You can
buy them anywhere anytime at $.5.00. All
I can say is-alas!

Curry, '94, is the Epworth League lawyer of the crowd. He is versatile. He
led the Epworthless League on 'Monday
night and went into court on Tuesday
morning and tried a suit to recover on a note
given to protect margins in a bucliet shop.
The court frowned him down by nonsuiting him, and expressed surprise at a
young mail of his standing trying to recover on a gambling contract.
D. B. Replogle, '93, is (by his sign) an
"Advokat." He is also a patent attorney.
He has also a .specialty,to wit, real estate,
insurance, orphans' court, criminal law,
and general law business. This is the age
when a man must have a specialty. Replogic has crowded all the other ,Specialists
to the wall. He owns a fine home and
was married not long ago. For most of
his brethren from Carlisle he has a witherlay God bless him!
ing scorn.
One of the most successful of our men
is D. L. Fickes. He has made a business
of saving fund work, and is prospering.
Recently lie refused a flattering offer to
form a partnership with an older attorney,
preferring to paddle his own canoe. He
was recently retained to defend a man in
Ionroe County who was arrested for peddling without a license. Fickes shipped
his books by freight the day before-Purdon's Digest, 2 vol.; Dunlap's Forms;
Wharton's Crim. Law, 4 vol.; Blackstone
and Kent-and went "by easy stages" on
1). L. & W. 11. R. to Stroudsburg on the
day of hearing. Arrived at the station he
engaged a four-horse team to cart his law
to the Squire's-about twelve parasangs
into the woods. The whole township
turned out. There were sales, and games,
and horse trades-oh, it was a big time.
The ease was finally called. Fickes made
the argument of his life. The judgment
was "Young man, I vas my mind already
made before you vas come, aind it; guilty,
mid $4 found."
T. P. Duffy, '96, has offices with J. F.
Gilroy. Duffy is an old Scrantonian and
is doing well.
J. Frey Gilroy has two offices-one in
central Scranton, and one in Providence,
near his home.
Jeffreys, '96, and Ruddy, '96, are together. Both seem satisfied with the progress they are making. They are bright
and industrious.
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Shean, '96, is with M. P. Cawley.
Shean is pleasant and hopeful. Cawley
was a member of the Law School in Scranton, but did not attend at Carlisle. He
was admitted to the bar here when the
Law School closed. The firm is doing
business, and doing it well.
J. H. Bonner, '95, is the bane of Replogle's life. They are suing each other
when they don't sue somebody else, and
they keep things moving.
As for the writer of this article "he
stands mute." Pressed to plead, he fixes
his eyes on the skies and exclaims in th4
language of the psalmist, "In the midst of
life we are in debt."

C.

BALENTINE,

'94.

Mr. Balentine is to be congratulated on
the victory he achieved in a murder case
tried during the first week of February at
Scranton.
Though the commonwealth
presented very strong evidence against the
defendant, Mr. Balentine so effectively
followed out the plea of self-defence that
the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter instead of first degree murder as
the commonwealth asked.
The daily
papers of Scranton complimented Mr.
Balentine very highly on the way in
which he handled the case.
[Editors

Forums.]
A SIGN OF THE TIMES.
There was a bright young lawyer,
But he had more hope than cash;
He waited for a client till
His bank account was"There's always room at the top," they
said,
"Of the ladder of fame sublime."
But the rongs were filled with women,
so
Pray how was he to climb?
"We can only build their ladders then"
He sighed, as well he could.
His shingle's down, he's saying naught,
But sweating sawing wood.
-Berntheiscl, '98.

Snyder, '98, is leader of the college orchestra. Berntheisel and Devall, juniors,
are also members of the orchestra.
Miller, '97, who has won distinction as
a bass singer, recently took part in a very
successful concert at Mt. Carmel, Pa.
James D. Edwards and William Escott,
of Kingston, and J. C. Manning, of
Pittston, visited Daniels, '98, last month.
Quite a number of the students heard
the lectures given in Bosler Hall by Dr.
Super, of the College faculty. The lectures
were part of a series dealing with German
literature. They were very interesting and
highly instructive.
A series of lectures are to be held under
the joint direction of the Dickinson and
the Allison Law Societies. The committees are as follows: Allison--Somerville,
Walker and Wetzel; Dickinson-Beistel,
Caldwell and Lafferty.
Three students entered the Junior class
this term. They are G. H. Moyer, of Lebanon, who is well-known in P. 0. S. of A.
circles; J. F. Scott and Charles F. Ralston,
each of whom came from the University
of West Virginia.
The criminal court of the county
opened on the 1st inst. and continued for
a week. It was followed by two weeks of
civil court. The students are taking advan'tage of the opportunities thus afforded,
by attending and noting the proceedings.
Moyer, '98, and Berntheisel, '98, were in
the cast of "TheDrummer Boy of Shiloh"
given last month by local talent of Carlisle. Berntheisel and Snyder -went to
their homes in Columbia during the last
week of January to take part in an amateur play.

J. Austin Sullivan, '98, was ill for a week
in January.

John Hays, Esq., one of the most prominent members of the Cumberland County
Bar, has kindly consented to deliver a
lecture before the student body in April.
The school is to be congratulated upon securing the services of so eminent a practitioner as Mr. Hays.

Some of the Seniors have begun to
write their graduation theses.

Both the Senior and Junior classes had
their pictures taken f6r the college annual,
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THE FORUM.
This publication has
The Microcosm.
been received with much favor for the
last few years and the present management is working.lard to make this year's
edition more interesting and valuable
than ever.
Thursday, January 28th, was observed
as Day of Prayer for Colleges. Rev. Wallace MacMullen, D. D., of Philadelphia,
preached the sermon in the Allison M. E.
Church to the students of the College and
the Law School. Dr. MacMullen isa scholarly preacher, and very eloquent, and his
sermon was greatly enjoyed.
H. W. McDowell, a former member of
the class of '97, is now in Denver, Col.,
where he is conducting a successful grocery business. Mr. McDowell left Carlisle about a year ago for the gold fields of
Alaska where he succeeded in finding
some of the coveted ore. He expects to
enter the Senior class of the Denver Law
School next fall.
The Junior class has chosen the following officers for moot court work: Judge,
G. Frank Wetzel; Prothonotary, F. B.
Moser; Clerk of Orphans' Court, J. Austin
Sullivan; Register, Lloyd Snyder; Recorder, Martin F. Duffy; District Attorney,
Claude Roth; Sheriff, A. M. Devall; Justice of the Peace, Robert Stucker; Constable, P. J. Schmidt.
The Senior class organization for moot
court practice is as follows: Judge, Thomas
K. Leidy; Prothonotary, George B. Somerville; Clerk of the Orphans' Court, H. F.
Kantner; Clerk of the Quarter Sessions,
Paul H. Price; Register and Recorder, C.
H. Hamilton; District Attorney, John E.
Small; Sheriff, E. L. Ryan; Justice of the
Peace, Simon P. Northrup; Constable, Andrew S. Schoener.
George B. Somerville and Thomas K.
Leidy, represented Dickinson Chapter of
the Delta Chi Fraternity at the annual
convention held at Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York, January 28th, and
29th. Mr. Somerville read a very interesting paper on 'hat
Shall Be the Standard of our Candidates," and Mr. Leidy dedelivered an oration on "The Supreme
Court of the United States," both of which

were well received. They report having
a very enjoyable time.
A joint meeting of the senior and junior
classes was held Wednesday afternoon,
January 27th. John H. Williams, president of the senior class, presided. It was
decided to organize abase ball association.
Samuel B. Hare, '98, was elected manager,
and Albert C. W. Rochow, '97, was chosen
assistant manager. An executive committee was appointed to act with the managers. The members of the committee are
Williams and Feight, '97; Devall and Hoffman, '98. It is proposed to organize a club
at once. There is good playing timber
in the school.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Law Society commenced
the new term very successfully by deviating from the course pursued during the
fall term and furnishing lectures instead
of the usual moot court trials. The first
lecture was delivered by Prof. George E.
Mills, Esq., a member of the faculty, and
one of Cumberland County's bright young
practitioners. Adhering closely, as he did,
to the important doctrines of that momentous subject "Landlord and Tenant,"
he interested the Inembers for about an
hour, discussing various relevant principles
which prompted considerable individual
thinking and resulted in not a little researching, incontrovertible evidence of the
interest manifested and of the lecturer's
ability.
The following week William J. Shearer,
Esq., of the Cumberland County Bar,
favored the society with a lecture on
"Criminal Practice," a subject which he
handles with a perfection that can be acquired only by an experience such as he
has had, being concerned in a large percentage of the important murder cases
tried in the different courts in the Cumberland Valley during the last decade, and
establishing a reputation as a criminal
lawyer, which is recognized throughout
the state. The lecturer spoke of the origin
of our present system of having counsel for
the defence, dwelling upon its advantages
and disadvantages to considerable extent
and in a manner most entertaining and
instructive. He then charged his hearers,
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never to shirk duty when called upon to
defend one charged with homicide, and
ever to "stick to the law" bearing in mind
that no lawyer is judge until he be elected
judge, nor juror until he is chosen as a
juror.- The latter principle was vividly
illustrated by the lecturer narrating experiences and citing a case, in which he
took an active part, with telling effect
upon his audience and which made a lasting impression.
Both lecturers were liberally applauded,
and a hearty vote of thanks was extended
by the society to each, with a mark of appreciation not to be mistaken for mere
courtesy.

ALLISON SOCIETY.
Hon. J. I. Weakley, of the School faculty, was presiding judge at a moot court
case of the Allison Law Society on Wednesday evening, January 20. His clear
elucidation of the law of bailment was very
highly appreciated, and the society extended him a hearty vote of thanks, with
the expressed hope that he again preside
at one of the moot-cojirt cases.
The society in January elected to membership Benedict, '97, Livingston, Scott,
Ralston and Moyer, all '98.
John R. Miller, Esq., Chief Burgess of
Carlisle, lectured before the Allison Society,
the Dickinson Society joining, on Wednesday evening, February 3. His subject was
"Early Land Titles in Pennsylvania."
The address was replete with interesting
data concerning titles and lands in the
early days of the Commonwealth, and Mr.
Miller spoke in such an interesting manner that he had the closest attention and
appreciation of the student body. The
lecture was a highly instructive one and
a vote of thanks was heartily tendered
Mr. Miller.

such researches the people of these generations would know very little of "Benefit of Clergy," the "Right of Sanctuary,"
the " Law of the Forest," and "Trial by
Ordeal."
British legal reformers have always
shown a strong disinclination to make a
clean sweep of a system, no matter how
full of abuses. They followed this plan
with the "Benefit of Clergy." At first
the privilege of escaping just punishment
for crime was confined to such as had the
clerical dress. In those days the clergy,
like the king, could do no wrong. Soon
the very door-keepers of the churches
crept within the benefit of clergy law.
The custom carried with it a trial in the
bishop's court, where twelve compurgators, 'or witnesses to good character,
quickly cleared the criminal. "Benefit
of Clergy" soon became the criminal's
golden gate. The requirements were very
simple. A person must needs be able only
to read the first verse of the 51st Psalm in
Vulgate. The "Neck Verse," as it soon
became known, contained but three
words,-"Miserere .Afei, Deus," and few
were the criminals who could not read or
memorize these words. Women in those
days were outside the beneft of clergy, but
they were admitted by James I.
Henry VII. added a painful necessity to
the claiming of a man's clergy. A murderer was to be branded on the crown of
his thumb, with the initial letter of his
crime. A capital "T" marked those accused of other felonies. No second benefit
of 6lergy could be obtained. Both the
branding iron and the "Neck Verse"
were finally abolished, the former in 1705
But from the
and the latter in 1779.
time of Edward VI. until 1841, every
peer in the realm, "though he cannot
read," as the statute ran, enjoyed his
clergy, and often used it, as the State
Trials show.
CALDWELL, '98.

THE BENEFIT OF CLERGY.
The old time laws and legal fictions are
interesting to the historical student. They
afford, in their quaint fictions and queer
reason., valuable evidence concerning the
social customs, laws and habits of our
stern forefathers. Researches, which are
full of interest, have recently been made
among these antiquities. Were it not for

THE MOOT COURT.
ESTATE OF FRANCIS LEGRAND.
S. P. NORTHRUP and P. H. PRICE for
Exceptants.
When time is annexed, not to the paymert, but to the substance of the gift, it is
contingent. Gilliland v. Bredin, 63 Pa.
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393; Stover's Appeal, 77 Pa. 282; Campbell
v. McDonald, 10 W. 179; Patterson v.
Hawthorne, 12 S. &. R. 112; Provenchere's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 463; Pennock v. Eagles,
102 Pa. 290; McClures Appeal, 72 Pa. 414;
Moore v. Smith, 9 W. 403.
Beginning to reside in Camp Hill is a
condition precedent. Campbell v. McDonald, 10 W. 179; Hutchin's Estate, 9
Phila. 300.
A condition, though whimsical, will be
respected. Campbell v. McDonald, supra;
Gilliland v. Bredin, supra; Stover's Appeal, supra.
Death of Thomas and Samuel before the
lapse of eighteen months, did not relieve
front the condition. Stover's Appeal, supra;
Patterson v. Hawthorne, supra.
Little's Appeal, 117 Pa. 14, differs from
this case in the act to be done; and in that
the legacy was to McComb and his heirs.
A specific legacy lapsing, falls into the
residue; Gilliland v. Bredin 63 Pa. 393;
Campbell v. McDonald, 10 W. 179; Massey's Appeal, 88 Pa. 470; Woolmer's Estate, 3 WEh. 476; Harland's Estate, 13 Phila.
229; Reimer's Estate, 159 Pa. 212.
HORACE CODINGTON and H. CLAY BEts'TEL for Auditor's Report.
The condition was subsequent, not precedent. Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Iass. 336;
Burd v. Burd, 40 Pa. 182; Hutchin's Estate, 9 Phila. 300; Furness v. Fox, 1 Cush.
134.
The interest, therefore, being vested,
the possession alone being dependent upoli
the condition, which became impossible of
performance, by the act of God, the interests are absolute. Hutchin's Estate, 9
Phila. 300; Parker v. Parker, 123 Mass.
584; Merril v. Emery, 10 Pick. 507; McLachlan v. McLachlan, 9 Paige 534.
Even though the legacy be contingent,
the legatee had that interest which would
enable him to fulfil the condition and
claim under the will. Little's Appeal, 117
Pa. 14; 37 Barbour 496.
If there is any doubt as to whether or
not the condition was precedent, such
doubt will be resolved in favor of the estate being vested. Chess's Appeal, 87 Pa.
362; Amelia Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9;
Peterson's Appeal, 88 Pa. 397; Chew's Appeal, 37 Pa. 23; Lantz v. Trusler, 37 Pa.
482; Young v. Stoner, 37 Pa. 105; Womrath v. McCormick, 51 Pa, 504.
OPINION OP COURT.
The bequests of Francis Legrand are of
$2,500 "to each of three of my brothers
who shall take up their residence in Camp
Hill before, or within eighteen months
after, my decease." He had three brothers,
John, Thomas and Samuel, who, when
the will was written, and at his death,
were residing beyond Pennsylvania. John
took up his residence in Camp Hill, six
months after Francis' death. Thomas,

not resuming residence in Camp Hill,
died nine months after Francis. One of
Thomas' sons, Isaiah, moved to Camp
Hill six months after his father's death.
The other, Julian, remained beyond the
state. Samuel, having moved from Camp
Hill before the will was wvritten, his son
Harry had remained in that borough,
until Francis' death and afterwards. Two
other children of Samuel, Sarah and Jefferson, accompanied him on his removal.
Samuel died, never returning to Camp
Hill, one year after Francis' death, and
Sarah and Jefferson never came to Camp
Hill.
The auditor has allowed to John $2,500,
$2,500 to Isaiah, and $2,500 to Harry.
Who are the legatees? They are described by two notes. They are (1) brothers
of the testator; they are (2) such brothers
as shall take up their residence in Camp
Hill within eighteen months after the decedent's death. Possession of either note
without the other, will not entitle. To
reside, not being a brother; to be a brother,
not residing, will not answer the definition
of the benefited class. The principle stated
thus, by Smith, on Executory Interests, p.
281, is applicable; "Where real or personal
estate is devised or bequeathed to such
children
as shall attain a given age,
or the children who shall sustain a certain
character, or do a particular act, or be living at a certain time, without any distinct
gift to the whole class, preceding such restrictive description,so that the uncertain
event forms part of the description of the
devisee or legatee, the interest so devised
is necessarily contingent on account of the
person. For, until the age is attained, the
character is sustained, or the act is performed, the person is unascertained; there
is no person answering the description of
the person who is to take as devisee or legatee." McBride v. Smyth, 54 Pa. 245; Fairfax's Appeal, 103 Pa. 166; Chambers v. Wilson, 2 W. 495.
It is hardly correct to speak ofthe legacy
as being contingent. It is contingent only
as every legacy, gift, or grant is, viz: upon
the existence of the designated legatee,
devisee, grantee. A deed to X is void, if
X is not in existence. A legacy to Samuel
Thompson would be a nullity, if there
were no Samuel Thompson. This legacy
is null, if there are not brothers, who resume residence in Camp Hill within
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eighteen months after the testator's death.
But, had there been first, a gift to each
of the three brothers of $2,500, with a subsequent proviso that the gift should be
void, unless they should within eighteen
months after the donor's death, have begun to reside in Camp Hill, we think the
same result would in substance have been
reached. As the testator can withold his
gift altogether, he can condition it as he
chooses. He can require, e. g. a personal
appearance in the county, for the purpose
of demanding the legacy. Campbell v.
McDonald, 10 W. 179; Stover's Appeal. 77
Pa. 282 (reversing Hutchin's Estate, 9
Phila. 300.) Francis Legrand has chosen
to give $2,500 to such of his brothers as
begin to reside in Camp Hill within
eighteen months. His will cannot be revised by the Courts for any supposed capriciousness or whimsicalness. We cannot speculate as to whether he contemplated the possibility of a brother's dying
in six months or as to what. he would have
done had he contemplated such possibilty.
He has given the $2,500 to his brothers,
not to his nephews; and to such brothers
only as shall begin to dwell in Camp Hill.
John is such a brother. He must receive
the legacy. Thomas and Samuel, though
brothers, were not such brothers. They
cannot receive the legacy. Isaiah and
Harry, were not suca brothers, and were
not brothers at all. The award of a legacy
to them by the auditor was therefore
erroneous.
The legacies claimed in behalf of Thomas
and Samuel having lapsed, fall into the
residue of the estate, and pass to the residunary legatee. M\assey's Appeal, 88 Pa.
470.
The exceptions of the residuary legatee,
to the award to Isaiah and Harry Legrand, are sustained. Those of Julian,
Sarah and Jefferson Legrand are dismissed.
The report is rtcommitted to the auditor
that he may rectify his distribution in accordance with this opinion.

AMOS WEAVER vs. JEFFERSON
WODOCK.

d

arlu
SoO

Weaver's and Wodock's farms adjoin,
and are bounded by a road. This road
from M towards P is lower than the
farms. Wodock's farm is lower than
Weaver's. The water falling on a large
part ofVeaver's farm is drained into a
natural gully A-B, and thence upon the
ravine on the edge of Wodock's farm,
through which it reaches the road at point
M and pours down to P, and further. At
another point in Weaver's farm there is a
natural depression, and the water falling
upon about twenty acres is drained into
this depression, from which it has no outlet, but in which it remains until it
evaporates or is absorbed by percolation
into the soil. Weaver cut a ditch C-D
from this pond to the ravine on Wodock's
farm, through which the pond was wholly
drained upon Wodock's land, and ultimately upon the road. Wodock to prevent the flow of water from Weaver's farm
erected an embankment along the edge of
his farm. In consequence the pona on
Weaver's land became full and a large
lake was formed by the water that had
previously flowed upon Wodock's land.
In this trespass, for preventing the
drainage of Weaver's faru, it is agreed
that the damage caused by the pond is
$150; and that by the occlusion of the
gully- A-B, $225. The question of law is
presented, whether Weaver is entitled to
recover.
HARVEY E. KNuPP and HERIAN H.

GRISWOLD for plaintiff.
Damages are recoverable for preventing
the natural flow of water from the dominant to the servient estate. Surface water
drained into a ravine, a natural water
course, cannot be obstructed by the owner
of the servient estate. Kauffman v.
Griesemer, 26 Pa. 413; Martin v. Riddle,
26 Pa. 415; Miller v. Laubach, 47 Pa. 154;
Meixel v. Morgan; 149 Pa. 418; Davidson
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v. Sanders, 1 Super. Ct. Rep. 432; Huddleston v. Borough of Bellevue, 111 Pa.
110; Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
160; Rhoads v. Davidheiser, 133 Pa. 228;
Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. 324; Bierer v.
Hurst, 155 Pa. 523; Angell on Water
Courses, p. 123; Amer. and Eng. Ency.. of
Law, Vol. 28, p. 959; Keller v. Staltz, 71
Pa. 356; Bells v. MeClintock, 9 Watts 119.
JULIAN C. WAL KER and Gxo. W.
BENEDICT, JR., for defendant.
Plaintiff had no right to cause the pond
to be drained upon the defendant's land,
by cutting the ditch, A-B. Kauffman v.
Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407; Martin v. Riddle,
26 Pa. 415; Meixel v. Morgan, 149 Pa. 415:
Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. 324; Pfeiffer v
Brown, 165 Pa. 267; Sackrider v. Beers, 10
Johns. 241.
Defendant had a right to erect the embanknient to obstruct the flow from the
pond, and because he could not do so
without obstructing the flow fr6m the
gully, also on account of the slope of the
land, he is not liable for the latter obstruction.-Kauffman v. Griesemer. supra;
Merritt v. Parker, 1 Coxe (N. J.,) 526;
Glass v. Fritz, supra; Martin v. Riddle,
supraz.

OPINION Or COURT.

Weaver's and Wodock's farms are contiguous, the latter being lower than the
former, and, having, along the division
line, a ravine. A part of Weaver's farm
is drained into a gully, which pours at
right angles into this ravine. At another
point there is a pond of water on Weaver's
farm, which he has attempted to drain, by
cutting a ditch from it, at right angles
into the ravine. This ravine, beginning
eastward of the pond, runs westerly, at
an inclination, past the point where the
gully empties into it, until it reaches a
highway which skirts the farms of both
Weaver and Wodock. Wodock has
erected an embankment on his land, along
the edge of the ravine, for the purpose of
preventing, as he has prevented, the flow
of the water through the ditch from the
pond, and through the gully, upon his
farm.
That Weaver had a right to have the
water flowing into the gully, borne upon
Wodock's farm, 4s not to be questioned.
The latter was in this respect servient to
Weaver's. Mfeixell v. Morgan, 149 Pa.
415; Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. 324; Kauffman
v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407. The land is
agricultural. Wodock's is by nature
lower than Weaver's. The gully is a
natural depression, and the drainage of a
portion of Weaver's farnl through it, upon

Wodock's is not due to artificial modifications of the ground.
It was the duty of Wodock to allow the
water thus visiting his land, an unobstructed entre. For impeding it by any
artificial barrier, he is liable to an action
of trespass. Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. 324.
[Formerly trespass on the case; Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407; Martin v.
Riddle, 26 Pa. 415.]
Clear as is the right of Weaver to an unimpeded passage of the water through the
gully upon Wodock's land, it is, we think,
equally clear that in permitting the pond
to be drained by an artificial channel,
upon Wodock's farm, he committed a
trespass. One man cannot drain his land
at the expense of his neighbors. In the
enjoyment of the drainage instituted by
nature, he will be defended. He cannot
supply himself to the detriment of others
with a drainage which nature has withheld. Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407;
Glass v. Fritz, 148 Pa. 324.
Wodock has encountered the trespass
thus committed against him by Weaver,
by erecting a barrier to keep off the water
pouring upon his land, through the ditch.
This he had a right to do. "Against any
contrivance, " says Woodward J, " to reverse the order of nature (i. e. to make
that land servient which was not by nature servient) he (the owner) might
peaceably and on his own land take measures of protection." 26 Pa. 407, 414, 415;
Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415; Glass v.
Fritz, 148 Pa. 324.
But the means adopted by Wodock to
dam back water pouring through the
ditch, also prevents the access to his land
of the water coming through the gully.
Is he justified in inflicting the latter injury incidentally to his warding off the
former injury aimed at himself? If water
is improperly turned by B, an owner of
land, into a channel which naturally conducts from A's land the water falling upon
it, upon C's, C cannot defend himself from
B's wrongful act by an obstruction to the
flow of the water from A's, although the
water from A's is mingled with that from
B's and one cannot be excluded without
the other. Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415.
In short, a man cannot defend himself
from B's wrong, by inflicting a wrong on
A,N
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The problem here is different. It is,
can Wodock obstruct the flow on his land
of water properly flowing on it from
Weaver's by a contrivance reasonably
necessary to prevent the aggression of the
water from the pond? We think he can.
"Against injuries of this nature" (i. e.
improper diversion of water upon a neighbor) says Jones, P. J. "one may protect
himself by necessary countervailing structures, and if som-. damage result to the
party whose action rendered such structures necessary, not more however than
may be unavoidable from a judicious and
reasonable exercise of the right of selfprotection, the party so damnified would
have no just ground of complaint."
Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. 407, 410.
In Merritt v. Parker, 1 Coxe (N. J. L.)
460; Kinsey, C. J., maintained the same
doctrine, saying, "In the present case, it
is impossible that Parker could discrininate between the water that was drawn
from the creek, and that which belonged
naturally to the rivulet; neither could he
prevent the one from flowing into his lund
without keeping out the other also."
But, it does not appear that the stretching of an embankment along the ravine,
and the obstruction of the water in the
gully were a necessary concomitant of the
prevention of the flow of the pond-water
through the ditch. So far as appears, the
one justifiable result could have been accoruplished without the other.
We think therefore that the plaintiff is
entitled to ajudgment for $225, the damage
arising from the blockade of the gully.

SAMPSEL vs. OVERSEERS OF BENNER
TOWNSHIP.

GEo. B. S0.1ERVILLE and H. S. KISER
for plaintiff:
The place of settlement of an illegitimate
child is the plate of settlementOf its mother at the time of its birth.-Act of June 13,
1836, 11, P. & L. Dig. 3553; Nippenose v.
Jersey Shore, 48 Pa. 402; Lower Augusta
v. Selinsgrove. 64 Pa. 166; Wayne Township v. Jersey Shore, 812 Pa. 264.
The order of removal was made out in
accordance with the act of June 13, 1836.
and the defendants were compelled to
grant relief.-Sugarloaf v. Schuylkill, 44
Pa. 481; Moreland v. Union, 6 Pa. C. C.
566; Bradford v. Keating, 27 Pa. 275; Renovo v. Half Moon, 78 Pa. 301.
No intendment is made against an order

of removal.-Reading v. Cumree, 5 Binn.
80.
Overseers have the power to make contracts for the keeping of those placed in
their charge.-Parker City v. Shaffer, 3
Penny., 101; Act of '36, supra.
WILLIs E. ZMACKEY and E. L. RYAN
for defendants.
The court of. Common Pleas has no jurisdiction in this case.--Nippenose v. Jersey Shore, 48 Pa. 402.
It does not appear that an order of relief
was gotten previous to the order of removal, and the latter is therefore void.-Oversbers of Elk Township v. Overseers of Jordan Township, 10 Pa. C. C. 245.
. An adjudication by two justices is necessary, in order that relief may be given.Overseers v. Baker's executors, 2 Watts
280; 2 Purd. Dig. 1704. It does not appear
that there was such an adjudication in this
case. The overseer therefoie had not the
capacity to bind the township.
OPINION OF COURT.

Mertie Ammerman, a bastard, was born
in Benner Township where her mother
had a legal settlement. After her birth,
her mother went to Spring Township, carrying iVertie with her, and the latter was
placed under the charge of the overseers
of Spring. Under an order of removal,
signed by two justices, she was taken back
to Benner, one of the overseers of which
contracted with Sampsel, a resident of
Spring Township, to furnish support to
the child there, in order that it might not
be deprived of the nurture of its mother.
Sampsel having recovered $182 for the
maintenance of Mertie Ammerman before
a justice of the peace, we are now entertaining an appeal from the judgment of
the justice.
The overseers can make contracts of the
sort of which this with Sampsel is a specimen. An instance may be found in Overseers of Poor of Parker City v. Shaffer, 3
Penny. 101. No point has been made that
but one overseer made the contract with
Sampsel. We think the objection, had it
been made, could have availed nothing.
But the overseers cannot make binding
contracts for the. support of everybody.
Do the conditions here exist for the effectual making ofthe contract?
Benner was the township of settlement
of Mertie Ammerman.
11, Act June 13,
1836; 2 P. & L. 3553; 2 Purd. 1706; N ippenose v. Jersey Shore, 48 Pa. 402; Lower
Augusta v. Selinsgrove, 64 Pa, 166. She
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never acquired any other. If she was a
pauper, it was the duty of the overseers of
Benner to provide for her. But, the overseers are not the judges of her being a pauper. "No person shall receive relief from
any overseers, before such person, or some
ue in his behalf, shall have procured an
order from two magistrates of the county
for the same." Sec. 6, Act 13 June, 1836;
2 Purd. 1704; 2 P. &L. 3532.
No order by two magistrates for the support of Mertie Ammerman was procured.
The precondition to the power of the overseers to furnish a support to her, was therefore wanting. No facts appear that could
dispense with such order.
It may be said that the order of removal
from Spring Township is equivalent to an
adjudication that she was a pauper. So
far as appears, that order .was not preceded
by an adjudication that she was chargeable or likely to become chargeable on
Spring Township. If the reasoning of
Krebs, J. in Elk Township Overseers v.
Jordan Township Overseers, 10 Pa. C. C.
245 is to be accepted, that order was for
this reason void. But, even though as between the two townships, the order of removal be deemed conclusive, we cannot
see how it can have any effect upon the relation of Benner Township to Sampsel.
Sampsel claims on a contract with the
overseers. He must show their capacity to
make the contract. He must show an ad-judication by two justices, thatMertie Ammerman was a pauper, and as such, chargdable on Benner. There has been no such
adjudication. In an action in the Common Pleas, whether she was in fact a pauper chargeable to the township cannot be
collaterally inquired into. Only the justices, or the Quarter Sessions on appeal,
can consider that question.
The order for removal may be made
"where any person has, or.is likely to become chargeable." 716, act June 13, 1836.
The order of the justice therefor for the
removal of a person, is not necessarily
an adjudication of more than that he is
likely to become chargeable" to the township. But likelihood to become chargeable
would not warrant the overseers in granting maintenance, for the probable future necessity for publicrelief might never become
actualized.
We do notthink, despite the suggestion

of Woodward, C. J. in Overseers of Nippenose Township v. Jersey Shore, 48 Pa. 402,
that the remedy was improperly sought
before the justice; and on appeal, in the
Common Pleas. Cf. Overseers of Poor 6f
Parker City v. Shaffer, 3 Penny. 101;
l)irectors v. Murry, 32 Pa. 178; Directors v.
Worthington, 38 Pa. 160.
For reas6ns indicated, the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover.

JOHN SMITH vs. ABEL STEVENS.
The plaintiff's claim is founded upon the
following facts. On the 20th day of May,
1890, the plaintiff; John Smith, and the
defendant, Abel Stevens, entered into articles of agreement for the sale of a piece of
land in the township of Middlesex, county
of Cumberland. In the said agreement a
covenant against incumbrances was entered into. On the 1st day of September,
1890, in accordance with the agreement,
a deed for the land was duly executed and delivered. No covenant against
incumbrances was included in thd deed,
but one of general warranty was. Shortly
after the plaintiff, John Smith, found that
there was a mortgage against the land for
the sum of $500, and was compelled to pay
the same by reason of a scire'faciasissued
on the mortgage resulting in a judgment,
and of threatened execution upon the same.
He avers that in accordance with the articles of agreement, it was the duty of the
defendant to pay the said mortgage, which
he was wrongfully compelled to pay, and
he therefore brings this suit.
HENRY W. SAVIDGE and JOHN HARRIS
WILLIAAs for the plaintiff.
A parol stipulation by the vendor of land
to refund the purchase money in the event
of a failure of title, and to reimburse the
vendee for any costs and expenses incurred, will not be merged in a deed containing a covenant of soecial warranty,
but no covenant of title, afterward accepted by the vendee in consideration
thereof. Close v. Zell, 141 Pa. 390.
A covenant in an agreement for the sale
of coal, to convey together with the coal
certain mining rights, is not merged in
the deeds subsequently made for the coal,
which omitted to convey the mining
riohts. McGowan v. Bailey, 155 Pa. 2.56.
'in a covenant against incumbrances, if
incumbrances exist, the covenant is broken
as soon as entered into; in general warranty, the covenant is broken only by
eviction. Knepper v. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 480.
The existence of the mortgage, and the
threatened enforcement of the judgment
recovered on it, constitutes constructive
eviction. Sprague v. Baker, 17 Mass. 585.
JOHN E. SMALL and H. FRANKLIN
KANTNER for the defendant.
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A grantee, who, under an agreement for
the conveyance to him of lands, is entitled
to insist upon a deed with a covenant
against incumbrances, is tendered a deed
not conforming to the agreement, accepts
it and an incumbrance unknown at the
time to either party is thereafter discovered. In the absence of fraud no legal liability rests upon the grantor, nor is the
grantee entitled to any relief. Whittemore v. Farrington, 76 N. Y. 454.
The acceptance of the deed constituted a
full execution of the prior agreement,
which is merged in the deed. Rice v.
Lewis, Atlantic 810; Madore's Appeal, 129
Pa. 15; Whittemore v. Farrington, 76 N.
Y. 454.
A mortgage is an incumbrance which
affects the title and a covenant of this kind
is broken the instant it is made. Funk
v. Voneida, 11 S. & R. 109; Memmert v.
McKeen, 112 Pa. 320.
The agreement not having been under
seal, and the covenant having been broken
at the time of the making of the contract
of sale, the action is barred by the Statute
of Limitations.
CHARGE OF COUav.
Gentlemen of the Jury:
On May 20th, 1890, Smith and Stevens
entered into articles of agreement for the
sale of a tract of land by the latter to the
former, the agreement containing "a covenant against incumbrances." On Sept. 1,
1890, in accordance with this agreement, a
deed was duly executed and delivered, in
which there was no covenant against incumbrances, but there was one of general
warranty. Shortly after, Smith discovered a mortgage for $500 upon the land,
which, on account of a scire facias, a
judgment, and a threatened execution, he
was compelled to pay. He sues in assumpsit to recover the $500 from Stevens.
The articles contained a "covenant
against incumbrances."1 A mortgage is an
incumbrance, Rawle Coy. Tit. 96, and its
existence even, still more its enforcement,
was a breach of the covenant. Rawle,
Covenants for Title, (4th. ed.) 89; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 229; Knepper v.
Kurtz, 58 Pa. 480. For its mere existence,
Smith would have been entitled to nominal damages. Having paid the incumbrance, he may recover what he has so
paid. Funk v. Voneida, 11 S. & R. 109.
But, two objections to such recovery
have been urged. It is said, (1) that the
Statute of Limitations has barred the
action; and (2) that the covenant in the
articles has been drowned in the deed.

(1) The articles were under seal. The
Statute of Limitations does not run against
a specialty. The "covenant against incumbrances" is a specialty.
(2) Nor are we convinced that the covenant was merged in the deed. The theory
of merger is founded on- the presumed or
proved intention of the parties. Express
evidence of intention to merge the articles
in the deed, there is none. The covenant
in the deed is not equivalent to that in
the articles, so that the intention to absorb
the latter in the former cannot be inferred
from their identicalness. A deed with
special warranty does not extinguish a
previous parol agreement to refund the
purchase money on a failure of title.
Close v. Zell, 141 Pa. 390. A deed with
general warranty does not put an end to an
oral promise by the vendor to indenmitv
the vendee for improvements, should the
Richardson v.
title prove worthless.
Gosser, 26 Pa. 3-5. A special agreement
to repay to the vendee all costs, charges
and damages, on account of any action
brought against him by any claimant of
the land, survives the deed. Cox v.
Henry, 32 Pa. 18. A deed to A's son, under and subject to a mortgage, does not
merge the previous promise by A to pay
the mortgage and so indemnify the grantor. Stockton v. Gould, 149 Pa. 68; Cf.
McGowan v. Bailey, 155 Pa. 256. We
think the covenant in the articles survived
the conveyance.
But, the declaration of the plaintiff will
permit him to recover on the covenant of
warranty,if it has been broken. Has it
been broken? That covenant is broken
only on an eviction. On the judgment recovered on the scirefacia.swr mortgage, an
execution and a sheriff's sale were threatened, and the mortgage was purchased to
avoid the sale. This was a constructive
eviction. Brown v. Dickerson, 12 Pa. 372;
Rawle, Covenants for Title, Ed. 1873; 162,
168, 169, 171; 18 Am. & Eng. Eincyc. Law,
990, 991,992. Cf. Dictain Stewart v. West,
14 Pa. 336, [In Sprague v. Baker, 17 Mass.
585, was a covenant for quiet enjoyment,
which is broken, according to Gibson, C.
J., Stewart v. West, 14 Pa. 336, by the mere
commencement of an action on the better
title.] Hauck v. Single, 10 Phila. 551;
Dickinson v. Voorhees, 7 W. & S.353.
The covenant was then broken, and the
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amount of money paid to secure the land,
not exceeding the price paid for it, can be
recovered as damages by the plaintiff. We
cannot, therefore, gentlemen of the jury,
instruct you, as we have been requested,
that there can be no recovery. On the
contrary, we instruct you that, on the undisputed evidence, the plaintiff is entitled
to a verdict for $500, with interest from the
time he paid that amount to the mortgagee.
ESTATE OF JOHN DAVBACH,
DECEASED.
HUGH R. MILLER and PAUL H. Pimc
for the exceptants.
(1.) Presumption of payment arises
after twenty years.-Reed v. Reed, 46 Pia.
239; Eby v. Eby's Assignee, 5 Pa. 43.5;
Stout v. Levan, 3 Pa. 235; Peter'sAppeal,
10U Pa. 340. (a) Computation runs from
the period when the money was demandable.-Deimer v. Sechrist, 1 P. & W. 419.
(b) Presumption is complete on the ex
piration of twenty years, after which it
gathers strength with every succeeding
year and requires a corresponding increase
in the weight of evidence to overthrow it.
-Cope v. Humphreys, 14 S. & R. 1.5;
Bentley's Estate, 9 Phila. 344.
(2.) Should thepresumption be repelled,
the amount of $1,000 and interest from tih
death of the decedent can only be claimed.
-Bachman v. Killiuger, 55 Pa. 414.
THO.5AS KEmiMERER LEIDY and JOSEPH
F. BIDDLE for claimant.
The claimant, Mary Dainbach, by reason
of her marriage, has never been able to
sue her husband on the bond.-Act 8
June, 1895, 2 P. & L. Dig. 2906; Ritter v.
Ritter, 31 Pa. 390. Marsteller v. Marsteller
93 Pa. 3.50; Wormley's Estate, 137 Pa. 101.
No right of action could accrue to the
claimant until the death of her husband
and her appointment as administratrix, so
that the statute of limitations or the presumption of payment could not run against
her before Oct. 7, 1895.-Act 27 TMarch,
1713, 1 P. & L. Dig. 2670; Kutz's Appeal,
40 Pa. 90; Lahr's Appeal, 90 Pa. 507; Miller
v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170; Towers v. Hagner, 3
Wl. 48; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121
Pa. 611; Diemer v. Sechrist, 1 P. & W. 419;
Small v. Small, 120 Pa. 366; Kennedy v.
Knight, 174 Pa. 408.
OPINION OF COURT.

On April 3rd, 1860, Mary Kneff, who
did not reach her majority until April
12th, 1862, married John Dambach. On
the same day her guardian loaned, of her
money, $1,000 to John Daibacb, taking a
bond for $1,000 from the latter, payable in

2 years with 4 per cent interest. When
Mary Dambach reached majority, the
guardian assigned to her this bond. On
7th Oct., 1895, her husband died, she beFiling her accoming administratrix.
count as such in July, 1896, she claims a
credit therein for the bond, and interest
thereon, in all $2,450. To this, credit the
next of kin of John Dambach except.
The auditor has dismissed the exception
and to his report an exception has been
filed of the same import.
That Mary Dambach is entitled to the
principal of the bond, unless it has been
paid, there is no dispute. Thirty-two
years have elapsed since it became payable. Under ordinary relations, it would
have been presumed paid in twenty years.
The presumption is founded on the improbability of inaction for so long a time
by the creditor, if his debt has not been
paid. If that inaction can be accounted
for by some other supposition than that of
payment, the presumption is repelled.
The inaction is fully accounted for by
the existence of the marital relation between John and Mary Dambach.
At common law the wife could not sue
her husband. Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa.
396; Marsteller v. Marsteller, 93 Pa. 350.
Bystatute from time to time,a partialpower
to sue him has been conferred. She might
recover her property from her husband,
whenever he had deserted her, or neglected or refused to support her, or had
been divorced from her a menmsa et thoro
ii1 an action in the name of a next friend.
See. 3, Act April 11, 1856; 2 P. & L. Dig.
2906. She might bring suit against him,
even without a next friend, if he had deserted or abandoned her, or driven her
away from his home. Sec. 2, Act June
11, 1879; 2 P. & L. Dig. 2907. The act of
June 3, 1887, P. L. 333, did not authorize a
suit by a wife against the husband; Small
v. Small, 129 Pa. 366; Kennedy v. Knight,
174 Pa. 408, and the third section of the
act of June8, 1893, 2 P. & L. Dig. 2905, expressly declares that "she may not sue her
husband"- except (a) in proceedings for
divorce, or (b) to recover or protect her
property, whenever he has deserted, or
neglected, or refused to support her. At
no time then down to the discoverture of
Mary Dambach, by her husband's death,
has she been able to maintain a suit against
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him. This is a full explanation of the delay in resorting to legal demand. The
-presumption of payment is overthrown.
It remains to consider whether Mary
Dambach is entitled to recover interest on
the bond from (late. It purported to bear
4 per cent interest until maturity, and
thereafter It bore six per cent. Ludwick
Had the
v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51.
bond remained with the guardian, he
could have coerced payment of the principal and the interest. When the ward accepted the bond from him, in partial discharge of the liability as guardian to her,
must we suppose that the duty of the
obligor to pay interest was suspended?
When money or other property of the
wife is with her consent taken by her
husband without stipulation for rent or
interest, there is a presumption that he is
not to pay her for the use of this money or
property. Wormley's Estate, 137 Pa. 101;
May v. May, 62 Pa. 206. If he takes it
without her consent., May v. May, 62 Pa.
206; or if he expressly agrees to pay intereat, Graybill v. Meyer, 45 Pa. 530, he must
pay interest. We see no circumstance to
indicate a consent of Mary Dambach to
the retention of the $1,000 without interest
to her husband. He had received it, as a
loan, from her guardian. It does nob appear that she was a party to the loan,
though perhaps the coincidence of the
making of the loan with the marriage
justifies a suspicion that she consented to
it. If she is to be regarded as consenting to
it, she must also be regarded as consenting
to it on the assumption of the husband to,
pay 4 per cent. The payment was to be
made despite the coverture, because the
coverture existed when the bond containing the stipulation for interest was made.
The express undertaking to pay interest
negatives the hypothesis of an understanding with hiswife that he was not to pay it.
Nor do we see any reason for surmising
that when the bond matured,she consented
to the total suspension of interest. The
remarks of Pearson J. in Bachman v.
Killinger, 55 Pa. 414, are not entirely convincing. They are not endorsed by the
Supreme Court, for they were favorable to
the plaintiff in error, who could not therefore complain of them. In Kennedy v.
Knight, 174 Pa. 408, interest was allowed
the wife on the husband's note, but, unfortunately, the stipulation concerning in-

terest, therein, is not described, and the
parties by a case stated, consented to the
judgment for interest if the court should
be of opinion that there could be a judgment for the principal. The decision of
the C. P. of Cumberland County in Stuart
v. Searight, 5241 May Term, 1896, if corxect, is not wholly relevant, because, of a

divergence in the facts, from the present
case.
We have concluded that Mary Dambach,
assignee of the bond, may collect on it both
the principal and the interest at the rate
of 4 per cent. for two years, and at the rate
of 6.per cent. for the remainder of the
period. The exception is dismissed.
ESTATE OF JOSEPH POLLOCK,
DECEASED.
Exception to the Auditor's distribution.
GEO. T. BROWN and H. CLA.Y BEISTEL
for the exceptant, cited: Beatty v. Byers,
18 Pa. 107; Joies v. Cadwell, 97 Pa. 45;
Fisher v. Harris, 10 Pa. 459; Brown's Appeal, 27 Pa. 62; Dunda's Appeal, .64 Pa.
325; Gray v. Smith, 3 W. 289; Roland v.
Miller, 11 W. NL.C. 431; Allison v. Wilson~s Executor, 13 S. &R. 330; Laird's Appeal, 4 W. N. C. 473; Bailey v. Bank, 104
Pa. 425; Mellon v. Reed, 123 Pa. 14; Chew
v. Nicklin, 45 Pa. 86; Campbell v. MeLain, 51 Pa. 200; Wistar's Appeal, 54 Pa.
60; Grim's appeal, 105 Pa. 376; Parshall's
Appeal, 65 Pa. 224; 1 Lewin Trusts 379,
Coffv. Biddle, 14 Pa. 444; Sheet's Estate,
52 Pa. 257; Campbell v. Pa. Life Ins. Co.,
2 Wh. 53; Carson v. Marshall, 37 N. J. Eq.
.213; Patterson v. Lenning, 118 Pa. 571;
Barker's Appeal, 120 Pa. 33, Beeson v.
Beeson, 9 Pa. 279; Rham v. North, 2
Yeates 117; Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3
Ves. 740; Chronister v. Bushey, 7 W. & S.
152; Spencer and Newbold's Appeal, 109
Pa. 317; 1 Perry Trusts, .428; 2 Lewin
Trusts 869; Pottery. Burd, 4 W. 15; Darroch v. Hay, 2 Yeates 208; Stuart v. Com.,
8 W. 74; 1 Rhone's Orphans' Court, 586, 1
P. & L. Dig. 1482, 115.
ALFRED JOEL FEIGHT and SIMON P.
NORTHRUP for the auditor cited: Witman
and Geisinger's Appeal 28 Pa. 378; Green
Rowvorth, 113
.. 462; Burr v. Sim, 1
Wh. 252;.Rice v. Bixler, 1 W. & S. 445;
Sherban v. Com., 8 W. 212; Costen's Appeal, 1 Harris 298; Estate of Andress, 14
Phila. 240; Erwin's Estate, 56 Pa. 405;
Edward's appeal, 47 P4. 144; Bleight v.
Bank, 10 Barr 132; Sterr's Estate, 13 Phila.
239; Bouslough v. Bouslough, 68 Pa. 500;
1 P. &. L. Dig. ?.60, 1943; 1 Cord, Married
Women 714; McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N.
Y. 459; Wistar's appeal, 54 Pa. 60; Buck-'
ner's Estate, 136 Pa. 23; Grim's Appeal,
105 Pa. 375; Fryer v. Rishell, 84 Pa. 521.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Joseph Pollock, dying in January 1875,
left to survive him 3 children, of whom
one was IMrs. Josephine E. Snyder. His
will "ordered" the executor to sell his real
estate and to divide the proceeds of it
Isaac
equally among these children.
Irwin was made executor. The real estate not being yet sold, Mrs. Snyder on
10th Nov., 1887, borrowed a sum of money
from Isaac Irwin, mortgaging her interest
in the land, as if it were still land. The
land bsing still unsold on 1 Jan., 1895,
Isaac Irwin was, at his own request discharged from the executorship, and his
brother R. S. Irxyin substituted as adm. d.
b. n. c. t. a.
The land was sold by R. S. Irwin, administrator, and an auditor was appointed
to make distribution of the proceeds. Betore the auditor, Mrs. Snyder, in Nov.,
1895, clainled the proceeds to the exclusion
of her mortgagee Isaac Irwin. Later, on 31
January, 1896, she assigned her interest in
the proceeds to L. H. Frantz. On the 28th
of the same month, Isaac Irwin "for value
received" assigned the mortgage to R. S.
Irwin, adm. d. b. n. c. t. a.
The audit not yet being ended, Frantz
claimed before the auditor the - coming to
Mrs. Snyder; and R. S. Irwin, the admin.
d. b. n. claimed as much of that * as was
necessary to satisfy the mortgage. The
auditor allowed Irwin's claim, awarding
to Frantz the balance only qf the 1. To
his report in this respect Frantz files exceptions.
That the interest in the land of the heirs
was, by the will, converted into one in the
proceeds of it, there can be no doubt.
Cases are so numerous, that it would. be
tedious to cite them. Let the following
suffice. Bailey v. Allegheny Nat. Bank,
104 Pa. 425; Mellon v. Reed, 123 Pa. 1;
Bright's Appeal, 100 Pa. 602; McWilliam's
Appeal, 117 Pa: 111; Jones v. Caldwell, 97
Pa. 42; Pyle's Appeal, 102 Pa. 317. When
she made the mortgage Mrs. Snyder
owned simply an equity in the land consisting in the right to compel its sale and
receive a share of the proceeds, or, jointly
with the other two legatees, to accept the
land in specie. Her mortgage, however,
was in the form in which it would regularly have been, had she been a co-tenant
of an undivided j of the land.

Was then, this mortgage effectual to pass
to the mortgagee the interest which the
mortgagor in fact had ? We think so. "As
between themselves" i. e. the mortgagor
and mortgagee, says Sterrett, J. in a case
in which a woman having an interest sinilar to that of Mrs. Snyder, executed a
mortgage, "As between themselves, the
mortgage was at least an equitable assignment of that interest."-Bailey v. Allegheny National Bank, 104 Pa. 425; Andress' Estate, 14 Phila. 240. So, an ordinary deed of conveyance would pass the
grantor's right to the proceeds of the sale
directed by the testator. Homer's Appeal,
56 Pa. 405; Costen's Appeal, 13 Pa. 292; 1
Jarman, Wills 603 [Ed. 1881, Little, Brown

& Co.]
Does the relation of the mortgagortothe
mortgagee invalidate the mortgage? Itis
urged, by exceptants (1 that the executor,
Isaac Irwin, being trustee to sell the land,
became, when he acquired the mortgage,
a purchaser of that which he was to sell,
and (2) that Irwin was trustee of the land
to sell it for the benefit of Mrs. Snyder,
and this fiduciary relation infects his purchase of her interest with presumptive
fraud.
1. Did Irwin buy at his own sale? He
was trustee to sell the land, but not the
interest in its proceeds of Mrs. Snyder.
She only could sell that. She only was
the vendor of that, and he only the vendee. The two relations did not unite in
him. Had he exposed the land to. sale
and thereat become the buyer, the two relations would have been blended in him.
His interest as buyer would have been inconsistent with what ought to be his interest as seller. As buyer, he would desire to obtain the land at the lowest
price; as seller, he ought to desire to get
for it the highest price. We cannot see
the combination of incompatible positions
in Irwin.
2. Did the fiduciary relation between
Irwin and Mrs. Snyder presumptively
vitiate the mortgage? When a trustee
buys from the eestui que tru.s, the trust
property, "the evidence must show that
the trustee made full disclosures to his
cestui que trust to sustain" the purchase;
Miggett's Appeal, 109 Pa. 520; Spencer's
Appeal, 80 Pa. 317. This principle readily
commends itself to approbation.
But,
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Mrs. Snyder did.not sell her interest in the
land to Irwin. Had she done so, there
would have been danger of imposition by
him upon her, in respect to the value of
the interest, relatively to the price he was
paying for it. But, he simply takes a
mortgage of the interest to secure the repayment of a sum of money. All excess
beyond this sum remains with Mrs.
Snyder, despite the mortgage. The only
conceivable imposition that might have
been practiced on Mrs. Snyder is, compelliug her toresort to borrowing, by delay
in selling the land, or exacting a mortgage
for a larger sum than was actually lent.
If Irwin was unreasonably tardy in making the sale, he mighthave been quickened
by the Orphans' Court, on the application
ofr mrs. Snyder. That she did not thus
apply, may be taken to indicate that to
her, the reasons for delay seemed satisfactory. If damage came to her, because
of the delay, Irwin could have been surcharged in the settlement of his account.
Surely he could not be punished by a forfeiture of $200, $2,000, or $20,000 that lie
might have loaned to Mrs. Irwin.
The possibility that the mortgage is for
more money than was actually loaned, exists. We cannot see that there was a larger
probability of such form of imposition in
this than in the ordinary relation of a
lender and borrower. The mortgagor may
always, under stress, contract to pay
more than he has received, and the law
allows him to show that he did so contract.
Hence we cannot find the relation between Irwin and Mrs. Snyder adequate
cause for dispensing her from proving the
excess, and imposing on him the burden
of disproving it.
Among many authorities examined we
find none to the effect that one holding
towards another, in regard to anything,
the relation of a trustee, and lending
money to his cestui que trust, can obtain
payment only on the condition that he
affirmatively negatives the want of consideration, except Wistar's Appeal, 54 Pa.
60. (The point was not decided by the
supreme court.)
After much reflection
we find ourselves unable to apply here the
salutary principle therein applied by
Judge Allison. The evidence of special
ascendancy over the mind of Wistar may
have been strong. There was none of any

such ascendancy of Irwin over the mortgagor.
The exceptions are overruled, and a
decree will be entered in conformity with
the recommendation of the auditor.

SAMUEL MORRISON vs. CALEB
OYSTER.

It is agreed. between the parties, plaintiff and defendant, in the above stated action that the following facts shall be submitted to the Court in the nature of a special verdict or case stated for its determination.
That on the 24th day of October, 1890
Abraham iMorrison made his last will and
testament which was duly probated in the
Register's office of the Dickinson School
of Law on the 15th day ofDecember, 1891.
That among the provisions of the said
will were the following: "And to my two
sons James Morrison and Samuel Morrison
I sell my homestead farm for $7,000 and for
the same I give, bequeath, and cancel for
my two sons, James Morrison and Samuel
Morrison, $4,000 as their share and portion
of my worldly goods and estate."
"It is further my will and I do declare
it, that James Morrisohi shall work the
farm that I give to him and Samuel 'Morrison, and farm the same until all the
charges thereon are fully paid, and after all
thie said charges are fully paid, the said
Samuel Morrison to receive the proceeds of
the said half of the said undivided farm,
but forever prohibited from selling the said
half Qr any part of the said undivided farm.
Nevertheless the said Samuel Morrison to
receive the proceeds during his natural life,
and when the children or legal heirs of
Samuel Morrison come to the age of
twenty-one years or more, then the said
half of the said farm to belong to the
children or legal heirs of the said Samuel
Morrison forever."
That on the 5th day of November, 1896,
SamuelMorrison, the plaintiff, entered into articles ofagreement with Caleb Oyster,
the defendant, for the sale, for $5,000, of his
undivided half interest in the farm so devised to them, the said James Morrison
and Samuel Morrison, and that the said
defendant declined to receive the deed offered. on the ground that Samuel Morrison
could not convey a fee simple estate.
If the Court therefore be of the opinion
that Samuel Morrison under the will of
Abraham Morrison took a fee simple estate
in the land devised to him, then judgment
to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for
$5,000 and costs. But if the Court should
be of the contrary opinion, then judgment
to be entered in favor of the defendant.
G. B. SNYDER and HORACE CODINGTON
for plaintiff.
The first clause of the will is olifficient
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to vest in the plaintiff, in fee simple, al
undivided half-interest in the farm.Fahney v. Holsinger, 65 Pa. 388.
After granting a fee, the testator could
not prohibit the plaintiff from selling any
part of it1 by a subsequent provision.
auretche v. Procter, 48 Pa. 466; Good v.
Fichthorn, 144 Pa. 287; Levy's Estate,
153 Pa. 174; Evans v. Smith, 166 Pa. 625.
"Children," in this case used in connection with the expression "or legal
heirs," is a word of limitation. Burkhart
v. Bucher 2 Binn. 4-55; Hardin v Hays,
9 Pa. 151; kotts v. Greisemer, 174 Pa. 516;
Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513.
I. 1. WINGERT and A. S. SHOENER for
defendant.
"Children or legal heirs" are words of
purchase. Hill v. Hill, 74 Pa. 173; Oyster
v. Knull, 137 Pa. 448; Pierce v. Hubbard,
152 Pa. 18; Weigley v. Conrade, 132 Pa.
147. The plaintifftook but a life estate.
Robbins v. Quinliven, 79 Pa. 333; Chew's
Appeal, 37 Pa. 9; Lantz v. Trusler, 37 Pa.
482; Cote v. VonBonnhorst, 41 Pa. 243.
The construction is to be made, not
solely on the bequest itself, but on the bequest taken in connection with the context, as well as the circumstances under
which the will was made. Rewalt v.
Ulrich, 23 Pa. 388.

issue was conteniplated. Guthrie's Appeal,
37 Pa. 9.
The word "heirs" is usually construed
to be a word of limitation, a devise to
"lawful heirs" denoting an indefinite
failure of issue.
We are of the opinion that the word
"children" in the present case is qualified
and limited by the words "or legal heirs"
and that these make it a word of limitation. This we think is justified by the
determinations in Mason v. Ammon, 117
Pa. 127; Potts v. Griesemer, 174 Pa. 51;
Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
plaintiff took a fee simple under the devise and that he may recover in this action.
And now February 6, 1897, judgnent .is
entered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for the sum of $5,000
with interest from the 1st day of December, 1896.
b . F. SADLER,
P. J.

MARY ADAMS ET AL. vs. JOHN
WYMAN.
OPINION OF COURT.
R. H. BARKER and HARVEY E. KNUPP
Unless modified and limited by subsefor plaintiff.
quent provisions, the first paragraph of
1. The trust should be determined.
the testator's will, referred to in the case
(a) For want of purpose. Ogden's Apstated, which annexes a charge to the
peal, 70 Pa. 501; Yarnell's Appeal, 70 Pa.
land devised to Samuel Morrison, gives
339; Kay v. Scates, 37 Pa. 37; Kuhn v.
Newman, 26 Pa. 227.
him a fee simple. Fahney v. Holsinger,
(b) Since all who are interested are in
65 Pa. 388.
existence, are sui juris, and have by their
In order to reduce this to a lesser estate
acts consented to its determination. Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145; Perry on
the intention of the devisor to do so must
Trusts, 920.
clearly appear from the other paragraphs
(c) It is not such an active trust that
of the will.
the statute of uses will not execute it.
The clause which prohibits the plaintiff Kuhn v. Newmman, supra.
from selling any part of his interest in the
(d) It places a useless cloud upon the
title and makes the property less marketland, being in direct conflict with the fee
able. Bacon's Appeal, .57 Pa. 504; Bisppreviously given, is void. Jauretche v. .ham's Equity, pp. 90-93; Kay v. Scates,
Procter, 48 Pa. 466; McIntyre v. McIntyre,
supra.
2. The trust offends the doctrine of
123 Pa. 329; Evans v. &mith, 166 Pa. 625.
perpetuities and should be declared void
Does it then plainly appear from the last
from its beginning. Donohue v. Meclause in his will that the testator inNichol, 61 Pa. 78; City of Phila. v. Gitended to restrict the devise to the plain- rard's Heirs, 45 Pa. 27; Smith's Appeal, 88
clear
must
be
There
tiff to a life estate?
Pa. 195; Coggin's Appeal, 124 Pa. 10;
evidence of such intent to justify the Lawrence Estate, 136 Pa. 354; Lewis on
Perpetuities, 446; Gray on Perpetuities,
Court in arriving at such a conclusion.
513.
Mickley's Appeal, 92 Pa. 514. While the
HERMAN H. GRISwoLD and J. R.
of
puris
a
word
rule is that " children"
S.%tITH for defendant.
chase and is not to be construed as a word
Tle trust is an active one. The fee is
of limitation, yet it may be coupled with
in the trustee. Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa.
other words or expressions which force 392; Hawkins on Wills, 140; Rife v,
Geyer, 59 Pa. 395.
the conclusion that an indefinite failure of
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An active operative trust leaves no
power in the cestui que trust to dispose of
the estate. Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa.
113; Williams Appeal, 83 Pa. 377; Mannerback's Estate, 26 W. N. C. 9; Sim's
Estate, 130 Pa. 451; Hutchison's Appeal, 81
Pa. 509.
The doctrine of equitable conversion
applies and the heirs take only a legacy,
and have no interest whatever in the real
estate as such. Roland v. Miller, 100 Pa.
47; McWilliam's Appeal, 171 Pa. 11I;
Bispham's Equity, p. 71; Craig v. Leslie,
3 Wheaton 563.
OPINION OF COURT.

By his will, probated May 10th, 1892,
George Adams declares "I give and devise
all the real estate that I own to my executors and their successors upon the following trusts, to wit, that the said executor
shall hold the said five tracts of land durig a period of 75 years after my decease
with the right to the exclusive control and
management of the same, and with the
right tQ receive and collect the annual
rents and profits of the said lands, and
shall pay the same after deducting all
proper expenses to my children, share and
share alike. After the expiration of the
trust, I direct my executors to sell the said
real estate and divide the proceeds among
all my children, share and share alike,
that may be living, and to the legal descendants of either of my said children
that may be dead, the legal descendants of
said children to take only such portion or
share of said proceeds as their deceased
parents would have taken, if alive."
On 2d June, 1896, the two children-of
George Adams, Mary and Arthur, agreed
in writing to sell the five tracts to Wyman
tor $3,300. Wyman declining to accept the
deed and pay the purchase money, on the
ground that the grantors could not convey
a good title, this action of assumpsit is
brought by the vendors to recover the
money.
If the trust declared in the will of George
Adams is valid, it is manifest that the interest which Wyman ought to get by a
conveyance, would not pass to him. The
legal ownership is not in the vendors.
They have no right of possession. The
trustee is to have exclusive control and
management, to collect the rents, to deduct therefrom the. proper expenses, and
to pay the residue to the children. Finally
at the expiration of 75 years, he is to sell
the land. It is evident that the cestais

que trust have only an equitable right,
which does not include the right of possession. Sim's Estate, 130 Pa. 451; Earp's
Appeal, 75 Pa. 119; Shankland's Appeal,
47 Pa. 113; Hutchison's Appeal, 81 Pa. 509.
As Wyman has not contracted to accept
such a right, he cannot be compelled to
pay for it.
But the vendor contends that the devise
in trust is void, and that, in consequence,
the testator, as to the five tracts which are
the subject of it, died intestate, they descending upon Mary and Arthur, as his
heirs.
Is the trust void ? The trust is to pay
over the rents, etc., to the two children during their lives, if they do not exceed 75
years in length, and, on the lapse of the 7.3
years, to sell the tracts and divide the p1oceeds. Io provision as to the proceeds is
made, between the death of Mary and Arthur, if it should happen less than 75
years after the testator's death and the
time of sale. The mere fact that the
estate granted to the trustee might exceed
the period needed for the execution of the
trust, does not vitiate it.
If land is conveyed to A in fee, in trust for B for life,
the trust for B's life is valid, despite the
excess of the estate over that of B. So, a
term of 75 years might be conveyed to A
in trust for B for his life, or so much of his
life as should not exceed 75 years. The
possibility that the term should exceed
the life, would not vitiate the trust.
What we have to consider now, is the
effect of a duty to sell imposed on the
trustee, to be performed beyond 75 years.
The sale would divest the interest of the
heirs of the testator, and transfer it to the
vendee. Who the vendee will be is contingent. Until the exercise of the power,
the estate. to be acquired by it will be
without alienability. While the sale
when it takes place, may take place
within twenty-one years after existing
lives; e. g. the lives of Mary and Arthur,
it, may not. They may die more than
twenty-one years before the end of the
period of seventy-five years. This possibility exposes the provision for sale to the
condemnation of the rule against perpetuities. Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. 10; Donahue v. Nichols, 61 Pa. 78; Hihlyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. 326; Laurence's Estate, 136 Pa.
354.
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But, will the annexation of a trust to
sell at a point of time too remote, to a
trust for the benefit of persons living when
the trust is created, infect this trust for
living persons with its own vice? There
is a rule that if a trust transgresses the
will in part, it transgresses it altogether.
We are not able however, to interpret this
rule so as to make it signify that if
there is a series of trusts created by the
same deed or will, some of which, as being
contingent and remote, are void, the trusts
earlier in the series, that are not too remote, especially if they are not contingent
but vested, will be vicious. We have examined, we think, fL the reported decisions of the Supreme Court, and we do
not find an instance in which a present
vested interest whether in a trust or not,
has been overthrown because of the Voidness of a subsequent contingent remainder,
trust or power. In all cases the first vested
interest had expired and the nullity only
of the succeeding interest, originally contingent, was declared. See Miffiin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205; Smith's Appeal, 88 Pa.
493; Davenport v. Harris, 3 Gr. 164;
Laurence's Appeal, 136 Pa. 354; Coggii's
Appeal, 124 Pa. 10. In Laurence's Appeal
(p. 365) Clark J., quotes Lewis on Perpetuities. "When, under a power, interests are given by way of particular estate
and remainder, and the particular estate
is limited to a valid object of the power,
but the remainder is too remote, the appointment will not be wholly void, but
only the gift in remainder. In such cases,
the interests in respect of which there is
an excess of the power, being distinguishable and separable from the valid
portion of the appointment, there is no
reason for involving the limitation in the
remoteness of the remainder." (See remarks on Smith's Appeal, on page 366;
also in Coggin's appeal, 124 Pa. 10; Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205.)
We have then a devise to a trustee for a
term of 75 years, charged with a trust to
pay the net income of the term annually
to Mary and Arthur. Their interest is
immediate and vested. The trust, at the
expiration of 75 years, to sell the tracts
and divide the proceeds is void for remoteness. But the voidness of the power and
of the interestq to spring out of its exercise
cannot impair the vested, immediate and

unexceptionable interest of Mary and
Arthur in the preceding trust.
During the lives of Mary and Arthur,
until the expiration of 75 years, there is
an active trust. They cannot by their
deeds pass an unincumbered estate.
Judgment must therefore be entered for
the defendant on the case stated.
REBECCA ANDRED vs. THOMAS
CHRISTIE.
I

THE SUPREME COURT.

Henry Mylin. anl habitual drunkard,
went in the even ilg, to the hotel of Thomas Christie, and in the absence of Christie
was supplied, for money, with several
draughts of whiskey by a servant in the
hotel. This servant was not authorized to
sell drinks, but on two or three occasions,
in the temporary absence of Christie, had
sold, and his actions had not been disapproved.
At about ten o'clock, Mylin went, while
partially drunk, to another hotel in the
same town and procured additional drink.
He soon became violently drunk, and as
was usual with him, quarrelsome and
brutal. On his way along the street, he
met Jacob Andred, a young mail eighteen
years old whom he, without provocatiob,
violently struck with a club. The blow
felled Andred, his head striking the curbstone and he became insensible. The night
was cold and he remained stretched on the
pavement for an hour, when a belated citizen passing along, found him and had
him conveyed to a neighboring house.
Andred recovered from the immediate effects of the shock, but was attacked with
pneumonia, the result of his long exposure,
and in three weeks, despite careful nursing
and competent medical attendance, he
died.
Andred was living with his mother at
the time of the assault and had been, for
two years, supporting her with wages
earned by him. He was intelligent, amiable -and devoted to his mother, of good
health and earning eight dollars a week.
The jury has rendered a verdict for $1,800
for the plaintiff, the mother, in the action
against Christie for damages for the death
of her son. On a reserved point, whether
under all the evidence the verdict should
not be for the defendant, the Court, after
argument of the point, entered judgment,
non obstante veredicto, for the defendant.
Before DOUGHERTY, P. J., CAREY and
BENNETT, J. J. DOUGHERTY, P. J., dissenting.
Plaintifi" appealed.
Error assigned was entry of judgment
as above.
HENRY W. SAVIDGE and GEo. B. SOMrERVILLE for appellant.
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The relation of agency may be established
by circumstances.-Valntine v. Packer,
5 Pa. 333; Woodwell & Co. v. Brown, 44
Pa. 121; 2 Kent, 614, note. So also may acts
done without previous authority be ratified.-Clark on Contracts, 720.
Persons sellingliquor to persons of known
intemperate habits are responsible for injuries committed by such persons while
under the influence of such liquor. - Taylor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617; Fink v. Garnian, 40 Pa. 95; Davies v. McKnight,
146 Pa. 610.
A reserved point-" whether under all
the evidence, the verdict should not be for
the defendant" is not a proper reservation.-Newhard v. Penna. R. R. Co., 153
Pa. 417; Wilson v. Steamboat Tuscorora,
25 Pa. 317; Wilde v. Trainor, 59 Pa. 443.
THos. K. LEIDY and ALFRED JOEL
FEiGHT for appellee.
A wilful wrong by an agent does not
oind the principal.-Evans on Principal
and Agent, 559. So also where the agent
acts outside of the scope of his employment.-Evans on Principal and Agelt,
A157, 558, 563 ; Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts 222:
Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. 482, 489; Pollock on
'Ports, 51, 60. An alleged ratification must
be with a knowledge of all the material
ftcts. Greenfield Bk. v. Crafts, 2 Allen
269; Combs v. Scott, 94 Mass. 493.
There is no evidence that the defendant's
servant knew of Mylin's intemperate habits. No liability results therefore.-Tayfor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617.
The act of selling liquor by the servant
of Christie was not the proximate cause of
the injury. There was an intervening
cause and the defendant is not liable.Hoag v. Lake Shore and Michigan R. R.
Co., 85 Pa. 293; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Kerr,
62 Pa. 353; West Maahony Township v.
Watson, 116 Pa. 344.
When two or more causes concur to produce an effect, and it cannot be determined
which contributed the more largely, br
whether without the concurrence of'both
it would have happened at all, and a particular party is not responsible for all of
the causes, there can be no recovery for
an injury thus caused.-Burdick's Cases
on Torts, 38; Marble v. Worester, 4 Gray,
395; Jenks v. Wilbrahaimt, 11 Gray 142;
Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen 514.

OPINION OF COURT.
In the Court below a verdict for $1,800
was rendered by the jury for the plaintiff.
The Court however, before submitting the
case to the jury, had reserved the point
whether under all the evidence, the verdict should not be for the defendant. Afterwards, after argument of the point, it entered judgment non obstante reredicto for
the defendant. And the question before
us is whether the evidence justified, in

law, a verdict for the plaintiff. If so,
judgment should have been entered upon
it. If not, the judgment for defendant
despite the verdict, has been properly
entered.
It is conceded that the sale to Mylin was
in violation of the law. The act of 8th May,
1854; P. L. 663 ; 1 P. & L. Dig. 2719, makes
any person, furnishing intoxicating drinks
to another, in violation of law "civilly responsible for any injury to person or property in consequence* of such furnishing,"
and directs that "any one aggrieved may
recover full damages from the person so
furnishing.
We think the learned court below correct
in holding that the fact that drink furnished by others than defendant contributed to the drunkenness of Mylin, will
not prevent a recovery.
Their opinion that the intervention of
the servant of Christie in the sale, will not
excuse Christie, is, we think, likewise unimpeachable. - Zeigler v. Commonwealth,
22 W. N. C. 111; Smith v. Reynolds, 8 Hun.
128.
The grounds of recovery, when recovery
is possible, are (1) "injury to person or
property" and (2) the consequence of this
injury upon the furnishing. The person
aggrieved is, of course, the person who suffers, in himself, or in his property, this
injury.'
(1) We are then to inquire whether
there is an injury to person or property.
Jacob Andred suffered an injury to his
person. But he is dead, and the present
action is not by him or his executor. The
law has given to the mother a species of
property right in the life and earning
power of her son, of which his death is a violation.-Act April 15, 18.51; 2 P. & L. Dig.
3233; ActApril 26,1855, 2 P. & L. 3234; Fink
v. Garman, 40 Pa. 95; Birch v. Railway
Company, 165 Pa. 339. Thedeath ofa husband, or son, has, under the civil damage
acts, been held to be an injury to property.
-Taylor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617; Davies v.
Mc Knight, 146 Pa. 610. [See case referred
to in 146 Pa. 610.] But do not understand
that counsel question whether the death
of a son is an injury to property in the
sense of the act of May 8, 1854; or whether
his mother is aggrieved by his destruction.
(2) The critical question is then,whether
the injury to property, which, in the legal
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sense, Rebecca Andred has suffered by the
killing of her son, is "in consequence of
such furnishing" of whiskey as is alleged
in the declaration.
Thekillingofyoung Andred was posterior to the sale of liquorto Mylin. We think
the jury could legitimately have inferredas in fact they have inferred-that the killing was a result of the sale. The sale put
the whiskey into Mlylin's power; tnat was
the condition of his drinking it; the drinking, they may have found, as they properly could, caused him to be "violently
drunk" ; the drunkenness, to be quarrelsome and brutal; the quarrelsomeness and
brutality, to fell to the ground young Andred, without provocation; the felling to
the ground, his insensibility and his lying an hour on the cold pavement. The
pneumonia was the result ofthis exposure;
the death was the effect of the pneumonia.
The chain of sequences is possibly somewhatlonger in this case than in some others arising under these or similar acts, but
the additional links are as firmly bound to
those which precede as any of the earlier
to. their neighbors. Perhaps a review of
some of the cases may not be unprofitable.
Sale of whiskey; the drinking it; the drunkenness, mounting a horse while drunk,
falling off, getting under the wheel of the
vehicle; instant death. - Fink v. Garman,
40 Pa. 951. Sale; drinking; drunkenness;
miles; entrance into barn,
walking home 3.1
climbing into hay mow; falling thence to
floor; removal to house; death next day. Taylor v. Wright, 126 Pa. 617. Gets liquor
October 25th, drinks; drunkenness; goes
home assisted by son-in-law; falls; rolls
into gutter containing water and mud; lies
there some time, being heavy, till help can
be got; reaches home an hour after leaving
saloon; is put to bed; shows symptoms of
bronchitis next day; on second day, of
pneumonia; and dies the 8th day after the
fall.-Davies v. McKnight, 146 Pa. 610.
Sale; drinking; drunkenness; exclusion
from hotel; departure; gets on tracks of a
railroad; is struck by a locomotive; is injured; leg must be, and is, amputated.-Veon v. Creaton, 138 Pa. 48. (The father
did not recover in this case, only because
he did not show that he was aggrieved.")
There are cases which hold that if
drunkentiessleads to an act by the drunken
person which injures himself, and by the

injury to himself, his father, mother, etc.,
suffers a detriment, the detriment is in
,'consequence" of the furnishing, although
in such a case, an act of the inebriate is a
mediate cause. Thus, a man intoxicated
killed his wife with an axe and then cut his
own throat with a razor. His son, 15 years
old, could recover from the vendor of the
beer by which the father was made drunk.
-Neu v. McKechnie, 95 N. Y. 632.
So, the inebriate may by his acts provoke another to hurt him, and by this

hurt his mother or father, husband, etc.,
may be injured and will have an action
against the liquor seller. In Jackson v.
Brookins, 5 Hun. 530, a sale of liquor was
made to four men, who becoming drunk, a
brawl ensued, in which three of them killed
the fourth. His widow had an action
against the tavern-keeper. [This case was
cited and not disapproved in Mead v.
Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493.]
A drunken man, lodging at X's house,
returns to it in the night, and in attempting to get in with violence, alarms the
owner, who, in order to defend his house,
fires at him, inflicting a wound from
which the inebriate dies. The vendor of
the liquor was liable to his widow.Schmidt v. Mitchell, 84 Ill. 195.
The drunken man's act may be directed
to the person of the plaintiff. He may
while drunk, with a pistol shoot A, A will
have an action against the vendor of the
intoxicant.-King v. Haley, 86 Ill. 106.
He may beat and wound A, A will have
the same action.-English v. Beard, 51
Ind. 489. "If," says Clark, J., in an illustration, "the drunken man had assaulted
his father and inflicted personal injuries
upon him, or had applied the torch to his
father's house, or had mutilated or destroyed his father's property, then, the
father, being aggrieved, might have sustained a suit for the injuries suffered."Veon v. Creaton, 138 Pa. 48.
In Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, a
son made drunk, drove his father's horse
excessively, killing it. The father had an
action against the tavern-keeper.
The father had a property-right in the
horse. This right was injured by the act
of the drunken man. Thesale oftheliqour
was therefore connected casually with the
plaintif's injury, through the voluntary
act of the drunken man directed against
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the horse. Suppose, instead of the horse,
a son, devoted to his father, rendering him
a support, and worth more to the father
than many horses. Is the hurt to A
through his horse, traceable to the sale of
the liquor, and the hurt to A through his
son not traceable to the sale of the liquor?
In Schafer v. The State, 49 Ind. 460, the
complaint alleged that Schafer sold liquor
to Harris, which caused 'his intoxication,
and that Harris because of such intoxication inflicted a mortal wound with a knife
on the body of Henry Cox, the husband of
the plaintiff. The complaint was held not
objectionable as not averring that the
death of Cox was a consequence of the
furnishing of the liquor. While the judgment was reversed because the 1st, 2nd,
3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 9th paragraphs of the
bill were demurrable, it was clearly held
that the verdict on the 6th and 8th paragraphs, had they been distinguished from
the rest, would have been good. Yet the
only cause of action was the killing by
the drunken man, of the husband of the
plaintiff.
The chain of causation may have two or
Responsibility can
twenty links in it.
hardly be graduated according to their
number. It is quite as easy to see that
the killing of Jacob Andred would not
have occurred, if Mylin had not prostrated
him and rendered him insensible, and that
he would not have struck him, if he had not
been drunk, as it is to see in the cases first
cited from Pennsylvania, that the inebriate
would not have died but for the intoxication. The responsibility of the dran-seller
cannot be cut off because the whiskey, instead of killing Mylin evoked in his brain
a fierce frenzy, which caused him to clutch
a club and fell an unoflending youth. If
the alcohol had caused death in him, his
wife would have suffered an actionable
wrong. Why does not the mother of
Jacob Andred, when the same alcohol as
incontestably causes death beyond the inebriate in whose arteries it courses?
It may not be uninteresting to compare
Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co.,
104 Mass. 64; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.
Y. 397; Carter v. Toune, 103 Mass. 507; 98
Mass. 567.
Judgment reversed, and the record is
remitted to the court below with direction
to enter a judgment upon the verdict.

STEPHEN MEREDITH vs. DAVID
DAVIDSON.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.

April 2, 1892, Meredith contracted to
sell a house and lot to Davison for $5000.
"to be paid for at any time within three
years." The deed was made and delivered
thirteen days later. The deed stated the
consideration to be $5,000, and acknowledged the receipt No note, bond, mortgage or other security additional to the
written contract was taken by Meredith
and no money was paid by Davison at the
deliverance. The deed contained a covenant of general warranty. There was, at
the time of conveyance, a mortgage for
$500 on the premises which a former
owner had put on and subject to which,
without notice of its existence, Meredith
had purchased the premises. He'was not
aware of its existence when he sold and
conveyed to Davison! Davison, however,
knew of it when he bought. Neither
Meredith nor Davison was ever called
on to pay any portion of interest or principal.
Assumpsit was brought by Meredith
against Davison, June 19, 1893, to recover
the $5,000 with interest from date of delivery of deed. The court permitted a
recovely for the whole amount claimed.
Motion for a new trial.
The reasons assigned by the counsel Tor
a new trial, are:
1. No right of action accrues against the
defendant for the purchase money until
three years after the contract was entered
into.
2. Under all the evidence submitted.
the verdict should have been for the defendant. After argument on the reasons
submitted, the court sustained the motion
for a new trial. Before CAMIPBELL. P J iURRAN and HARTMAN, J. J., iiAR'I
MAN, J. dissenting.
Plaintiff appealed.
Er'ror assigned was entry of judgment
as above.
GEORGE T.

BROWN and WILLIS E.

for appellant. When an engagement, by simple contract is subsequently
confirmed or continued by a sealed instrument, the simple contract becomes lost
and swallowed up in that underseal and becomes totally extinguished.-Smith, Contracts, 23; Bishop, Contracts, 129; Smith
v. Evans, 6 Binn. 102; Wilson v. McNeal,
10 V. 422; Crotzer v. Russel, 9 S. & R.
78; Williams v. Hathaway, 19 Pick. 387;
Hower v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506; Vhitbeck
v. Wayne, 16 N. Y. 532.
JOHN E. SMALL and H=. FRANKLIN
KANTNER for appellee.
A stipulation contained in a contract for
the sale of land, but omitted from the
deed executed in pursuance thereof, will
not be extinguished by merger, when its
place is not taken or supplied by the exMACKEY
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press or implied operation of the provisions and covenants which the deed does
contain.-Bean v. Steltz, 4 Mont. 10-5;
Feed v. Ritchey, 12 Cent. 551; McElroy
v. Nucleus, 131 Pa. 393; Close v. Zell, 141
Pa. 390; -UcGowan v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 572;
S. C. 155 Pa. 256; Stockton v. Gould, 149
Pa. 68.
OPINION OF COURT.

On April 2, 1892, Meredith contracted
to convey to Davison for five thousand
dollars a house and lot "to be paid at any
time within three years." The conveyance was made thirteen days afterward,
but although the deed acknowledged the
receipt of the five thousand dollars no part
of that sum was in fact paid, nor was
bond, note, mortgage, or other security
taken for it. At the time of the conveyance there was a mortgage on the premises
fori five hundred dollars, placed thereupon
by a former owner, of whose existence
Meredith was ignorant, but Davison was
aware, when the conveyance was made.
There has been no demand for interest
or any part of the principal of this mortgage. This assumpsit was brought June
19. 1893, to recover the $5,000 purchase
nmoney. A recovery by the plaintiff for
the whole amount permitted at the first
trial was set aside, and on a new trial the
Court below directed the jury to render a
verdict for the defendant.
The action is upon the covenant contained in the articles. By a singular inversion of normal position the counsel for
plaintiff insisted that the articles had
been merged in the deed, while counsel
for the defendant as strenuously contended
against such merger. The deed contains
no covenant to pay money by the grantee.
It is a mere conveyance lodging the
ownership of the premises in him. It recites the payment of the five thousand
dollars. If the plaintiff is to recover at
all, he must recover upon the contract
found in the articles. There is no other.
It would startle the legal world to
hold that by that conveyance of land in
execution of the vendor's part of the contract of sale, the vendee's part is merged
and lost. There are cases which hold that
even the vendor's covenants are not all
merged in his grant. A parol promise to
return the purchase money if the title is
not good, is not merged in a deed which
contains a special warranty.-Close v.
Zell, 141 Pa. 390.

The deed is not always a merger of the
contract even with the respect to the subject matter of the conveyance.-McGowan
v. Bailey, 146 Pa. 573; 155 Pa. 2.56. Other
cases may be found.
A careful research has failed to discover
a single case in which it has been supposed
that a conveyance which is the vendor's
fulfilment of his duty under the contract,
is also a discharge of the pre-existing contractual duty of the vendee The delivery
of the deed is often the precondition to the
payment by the vendee. He engages to
pay when the deed is delivered or afterwards. It would indeed be singular if the
performance of the very condition upon
which the duty to pay is to become absolute should extirpate that duty. We
think authority is unnecessary for the
doctrine that whatever the effect of a
deed on the grantor's contractual obligation, it cannot affect those of the purchaser. It is of course possible for the
parties to change the price or terms of
payment, at the time of the conveyance.
Bonds, notes, etc.i may be given for the
purchase money, and these might merge
the covenant in the articles of agreement.
The deed of conveyance itself, could produce no such result. In Stockton v.
Gould, 149 Pa. 68, A. and B. agreed to exchange lands and to pay the mortgage on
that which each obtained by the exchange. This agreement was not merged
in the conveyances. A could sue B upon
the agreement. There was in Feed v:
Ritchey, 12 Cent. 551 an action on articles
for purchase money after the delivery of
the deed. See McElroy v. Nucleus Assn.,
131 Pa. 393. The articles, in so far as they
contain the vendee's covenants, survive
the grant and the grantor may sustain on
them an action for the purchase money.
He can sustain such an action on nothing
else.
We have next to consider the effect of
the mortgage for five hundred dollars
upon the right of the plaintiff to recover.
That the grantee had received a covenant
of general warranty under which, if he is
ever evicted, he will obtain an indemnity,
would not preclude his obtaining a deduction from the purchase money when lie
has sued for it. The principle in Pennvania is that a grantee, sued for purchase
money, may defend on the ground of in-
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cumbrances, or defects of title, notwithstanding that his deed contains covenants
upon which in case of subsequent eviction
he could sue. Thus, the widow's dower
being charged on the land, the grantee,
although he has a covenant of general
warranty, may obtain a deduction from
the price in the suit for it; Roland v. Miller, 3 W. & S. 390. The same was held,
where there were legacies charged on the
land.-Fuhrman v. Loudon, 13 S. & R.
386; where a judgment lien, Christy v.
Reynolds, 16 S. & R. 253, or a mortgage,
Coke v. Kelley, 13 S. & R. 165; Juvenal
v. Jackson, 14 Pa. 519; Cf. Murphy v.
Richardson, 28 Pa. 288; Wilson v. Cochran, 48 Pa. 107.
The existenceof the mortgage for five
hundred dollars would have entitled the
defendant Davidson, to deduct that sum
from the purchase money finally or at
least until the removal (Juvenal vs. Jackson, 14 Pa. 519,) although there was a
covenant of warranty and the covenant
had been not broken, but for the fact that
Davison knew of the mortgage when he
accepted the conveyance. The appropriate principle is that when a vendee,
with knowledge of an incumbrance or
defect of title, accepts a deed with a covenant against such defect, he is presumed to
rely on -the covenant, and, until he is
evicted or the covenant is otherwise
broken, he cannot detain any portion of
the purchase money when he is sued for it.
Juvenal v. Jackson, 15 Pa. 519 (a mortgage lien); Wilson v. Cochran, 48 Pa. 107,
(a right of way); Bradfordv. Potts, 9 Pa.
37. (rival title in another); Lighty v.

Shorb, 3 P' & W. 447; Fuhrman v. Loudon, 13 S. & R. 386, (legacy charged on
theland.) In as much therefore as David
Davison had knowledge of the five hundred dollar mortgage, when he accepted
the covenant of warranty, he will be presumed to have intended to depend upon
the covenant, and not upon a right to detain a corresponding portion of the purchase money.
There remains to consider whether the
time stipulated for the purchase money
had arrived when this action of assumpsit
had begun. It needs no authority to establish the principle that there can be no recovery in a suit prematurely brought,
even if, before the trial, the debt has become payable. The contract here was to
convey a house and lot for $5,000 (to be
paid at any Oime within threeyears.) Who
has the power to select the point within
the three years at which payment shall
be made? The vendor or the vendee? The
burden of paying is on the latter. The
money is not bearing interest. The delay
must be intended to benefit the vendee.
It follows, we think, that the option concerning the exact time is with him, Cf.
Horstman v. Gerker, 49 Pa. 282; Paterson
v. Judge, 17 W. N. C. 127; Hoffman's
Petition, 14 W. N. C. 563; Schotte v.
Meredith, 138 Pa. 165. He may tender
payment; he cannot be compelled to pay
before the expiration of the three years.
The action brought fourteen months after
the making of the contract was premature.
We see no error in the decision of the
learned court below* and therefore the
judgment is affirmed.
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